Michigan Law Review
Volume 38

Issue 6

1940

LIBEL AND SLANDER - CHARGING PHYSICIAN WITH LACK OF
SKILL IN PARTICULAR CASE
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Communications Law Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, LIBEL AND SLANDER - CHARGING PHYSICIAN WITH LACK OF SKILL IN
PARTICULAR CASE, 38 MICH. L. REV. 912 (1940).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol38/iss6/18

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 38

LIBEL AND SLANDER - CHARGING PHYSICIAN WITH LACK OF SKILL IN
PARTICULAR CASE - Plaintiff, a practicing physician, sued to recover damages
for an alleged libel committed when defendant falsely published in its newspaper an article stating that plaintiff examined a prisoner in the city jail, diagnosed his condition as "alcoholic paralysis," and ordered his removal to a city
hospital, and that a post mortem disclosed that the prisoner's neck was fractured.
Held, that to charge a physician with having made a wrong diagnosis in a particular case is not actionable per se, and since there is no allegation 0f special
damage, there can be no recovery. Blende v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 200
Wash. 426, 93 P. (2d) 733 (1939).
The principle is well recognized that a physician is only required to possess
the ordinary knowledge and skill of his profession prevailing under similar
circumstances in similar localities.1 Likewise, most medical authorities would
agree that e,ven those physicians who possess the greatest amount of knowledge
and skill are susceptible to the mistakes and errors incident to human nature.
So long, therefore, as the article describing the conduct of a physician refers
merely to that conduct in a particular case, and only charges him with such lack
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of knowledge and skill as is consistent with the general ability of his profession
in similar neighborhoods, it is not actionable without proof'of special damage.2
The foregoing reasoning has been applied in cases involving both slander 8 and
libel/ so the result reached by the court in the principal case is justified on
grounds of precedent as well as reason. However, if the charge is of such gross
professional incapacity as imputes general unfitness, the court may declare the
plaintiff entitled to recover without alleging and proving special damage. 5 The
Washington court recognizes this rule that written words which expose the
plaintiff to contempt, hatred and ridicule constitute in themselves a cause of
action for which recovery may be had, whether or not actual pecuniary loss is
shown, and whether the defamation is apparent from the words themselves or
becomes so only after considering extrinsic facts. 6 But while in the principal
case the court correctly applies the substantive law involved, its terminology
with respect to the phrases "libelous per se" and "actionable per se" is at times
confusing. 7 The former term is properly used to distinguish language defamatory
on its face from that which is defamatory only when considered along with
extrinsic facts (libelous per quod) ,8 while in either case, so long as the defamation
is written, it is actionable per se, or, in other words, the plaintiff may recover
without showing special damage.9 Since it was clear in the principal case that
by "libelous per se" the court mean "actionable per se," the indiscriminate use
of the two, terms was not confusing, but possible ambiguity might be avoided by
following the distinction outlined above.
2
Tarleton v. LaGarde, 46 La. Ann. 1368, 16 So. 180, 26 L. R. A. 325 {1894);
NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL, 4th ed., §§ 138, 146 (1924).
8
Poe v. Mondford, Cro. Eliz. 620, 78 Eng. Rep. 861 (1598); Camp v. Martin,
23 Conn. 86 {1854). As to dentists, see: Twigger v. Ossining Printing & Publishing
Co., 161 App. Div. 718, 146 N. Y. S. 529 (1914).
~ Rodgers v. Kline, 56 Miss. 808 {1879); 36 C. J. n87 (1924); 17 R. C. L.
308 (1917).
5
Sumner v. Utley, 7 Conn. 257 (1828); Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co., 35 Minn.
251, 28 N. W. 708 {1886); Gauvreau v. Superior Publishing Co., 62 Wis. 403, 22
N. W. 726 {1885); NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL, 4th ed., § 146 (1924). In
general, see Vosbury v. Utica Daily Press Co., 183 App. Div. 769, 171 N. Y. S.
827 (1918); also, DePasquale v. Westchester Newspapers Inc., 170 Misc. 268, 8
N. Y. S. (2d) 829 (1938).
6
Wilson v. Sun Publishing Co., 85 Wash. 503, 148 P. 774 (1915). Also see
principal case.
7 "The determination of the merit of this assignment necessitates an inquiry
into whether the published article is libelous per se." 93 P. {2d) at 734. And at the
close of the decision, "Since the alleged defamatory publication is not actionable per
se, and the complaint is barren of any allegation of special damages••••" 93 P. (2d)
at 736.
8
HARPER, ToRTs, § 243 (1933); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C.
780, 195 S. E. 55 (1937).
9
HARPER, ToRTS, § 243 (1933); NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL, 4th ed.,
§ 735 (1924). See, however, 38 M1cH. L. REv. 253 (1939), for discussion of the
rule, followed by some courts, that where words are libelous per quod the plaintiff
must allege and prove special damage.

